THE DEVELOPING CONCEPT AND ITS FUNCTIONS 195 



symbol comes to be attached to a given concept operates power- 

 fully in rendering the concept fixed and definite. What fre- 

 quently happens is that some image of the word (visual, auditory, 

 or motor) becomes the habitual psychological representative 

 through which the concept functions. The word serves thus as 

 a sort of nucleus for the larger and looser associative organization, 

 and thus furthers the conservation of the concept. 



No modern treatment of the nature of the general concept can 

 afford to neglect Berkeley's epoch-making theory. Nowhere in 

 Berkeley's writings is there to be found a more brilliant or effec- 

 tive application of his new-found introspective method than his 

 treatment of abstract ideas. Not only did this treatment revolu- 

 tionize contemporary theories, but it has exerted a profound 

 influence on the whole later development of psychology. 



The gist of Berkeley's account of the matter is contained in the 

 following passage. "Now, if we will annex a meaning to our 

 words, and speak only of what we can conceive, I believe 

 we shall acknowledge that an idea which, considered in itself, 

 is particular, becomes general by being made to represent or 

 stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort. To make 

 this plain by an example, suppose a geometrician is demonstrating 

 the method of cutting a line in two equal parts. He draws, 

 for instance, a black line of an inch in length: this, which in 

 itself is a particular line, is nevertheless with regard to its signifi- 

 cation general, since, as it is there used, it represents all particular 

 lines whatsoever; so that what is demonstrated of it is demon- 

 strated of all lines, or, in other words, of a line in general." 1 

 In a closely succeeding passage, Berkeley notes that a particular 

 idea which acquires the function of standing for a class of ideas 

 undergoes structural modification to this extent: that those fea- 

 tures which it has in common with the other members of the 

 class are emphasized or alone attended to, although its peculiar 

 features cannot be w r holly banished from consciousness. 2 



^Principles of Human Knowledge, Introduction, 12. 

 *Ib., 16. 



