PRAGMATISM AND THE FORM OF THOUGHT 209 



on to the drawing of further inferences is itself a piece of conduct 

 in which earlier thought finds its extinction ; and that the mean- 

 ing which we ascribe to the term Validity' is exhausted in its 

 reference to such conduct. To this we have no objection; but 

 we think it necessary to call attention to several important fea- 

 tures of the argument. 



In the first place, the conduct just mentioned is not to be 

 confused with the conduct to which implied reference is made 'n 

 the conclusion. Suppose, for example, that it has been demon- 

 strated by the methods of elementary geometry, that a triangle 

 is determined by the length of its three sides. This is a most 

 useful principle in many lines of activity, very conspicuously in 

 building. It means, for one thing, that a triangular structure 

 made of stiff material is non-collapsible, even though its corners 

 be hinged, and, consequently, that such a structure has no need 

 of further bracing. The rectangle is known not to have this 

 property; and accordingly a frame of that shape is frequently 

 given greater rigidity by constructing a triangle in one of its 

 corners. Now it is in its reference to such practical applications 

 as this that the meaning of the proposition consists; and its 

 truth is confirmed by the satisfactory issue of the conduct thus 

 prompted. The point to which special attention must be called, 

 is that, according to the interpretation of the pragmatist doctrine 

 which we are now considering, this is not the conduct in reference 

 to which the validity of the demonstration itself has its meaning. 

 The meaning of Validity' is found in the characteristic mental 

 procedure involved in accepting the conclusion as warranted by the 

 premises, and which would be generically the same, whether the 

 premises (and accordingly the conclusion) were regarded as true, 

 as probable, as possible, or even as contrary to fact. Here, as 

 elsewhere, of course, no single definite act can be pointed out as 

 unequivocally referred to by the concept; but that fact offers 

 no greater difficulty here than in the case of physical behavior. 



In the second place, it is implied that apart from the interest 

 attaching to the environmental situation which indirectly promp- 

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