210 DOGMATISM AND EVOLUTION 



ted the whole argument, there is likewise a specific interest at- 

 taching to the logical situation as such. This situation is 

 formulated in a problem, the solution of which is contained in 

 the acceptance of the conclusion as correctly derived. That 

 such a specific interest exists is very commonly believed, and is 

 by no means an untenable hypothesis. Logical validity is thus 

 recognized as a kind of value depending upon a specific sentiment 

 and as in so far comparable to esthetic and moral values. 



In the third place, the special point which we have had in 

 view throughout this digression is now readily established, 

 namely that the opposition of pragmatism to merely formal logic 

 has no solid basis. The familiar pragmatist doctrine, that 

 thought has no validity apart from its function in controlling 

 conduct, seems like a subterfuge when we reflect that the conduct 

 to which logical validity refers is logical procedure itself. It is no 

 subterfuge, however, but only the result of an afterthought 

 which reestablishes what at first sight seemed done away with. 

 And after all, though the negative result proved deceptive, the 

 positive results which may be safely enumerated are not small. 

 It is no small gain to have learned, that in so far as thought has 

 a distinctive form, it must be viewed as purposive behavior 

 animated by a distinctive human interest. It surely is not a 

 less welcome, because a somewhat unexpected, outcome of the 

 pragmatist philosophy, that theoretical values as such are re- 

 stored to their ancient position of dignified independence of 

 more narrowly 'practical' needs. 



Let it be noted that in asserting against the pragmatist the 

 indispensability of the conception of a form of thought as such, 

 we do not commit ourselves to any dogma as to the universality 

 or permanence of this form. We need assert no greater claims 

 for the form of thought (however it be expressed) than we are 

 ready to assert for the fundamental laws of mechanics. In either 

 case, if an absolute exist we can never know it ; and any ascription 

 of qualities to the unknowable is sheer play of fancy. The form 



