HUMANISM 227 



The connection is made out in several ways, which require 

 separate examination. 



In the first place, it is held that a complete determinism is a 

 mere rationalistic assumption, exalted into an axiom that is not 

 subject to correction by any evidence; while an indeterminism, 

 which leaves the relative scope of freedom and necessity open to 

 empirical enquiry, and is satisfied with any amount of indeter- 

 mination above absolute zero, is relatively open-minded. The 

 latter theory is, therefore, the one which the pragmatist, holding 

 to the practical character of all knowledge, is bound to prefer; 

 though the former is not excluded as an utter impossibility. 



In reply we should call attention to the fact that no experiment 

 can be imagined, the result of which would be noticeably different 

 according as one or other of the opposed theories was true. So 

 far, then, from entertaining a preference for one or the other 

 theory, pragmatism (like any other thorough-going empiricism) 

 ought to regard the difference between them as illusory. Such, 

 upon a closer examination, we find to be the case. The crux of the 

 matter lies in the unlimited indefiniteness of the term 'determina- 

 tion' and its equivalents and correlatives, such as 'causation' and 

 'necessity.' Determination, as we know it, is of various types, 

 under various conditions. These types are not related to each 

 other as species of a precisely definable genus, but as analogous 

 forms for which a proper genus remains to be found, and to 

 which additions may be made that call for modification of the 

 genus. Consider in this connection a few of the meanings which 

 have attached to the term 'causality.' It is the communication 

 of motion by impact; or the relation of premise to conclusion; or 

 the relation of antecedent to consequent in a uniform succession ; 

 or the transformation of energy: the only causes are moving 

 bodies; or spirits; or ideas; or emotions; or truths; or events: 

 there may be distinct chains of causation; or the only proper 

 connection may be between the universe as a whole at different 

 moments; or there may be distinct initiations of causal activity, 

 though the scope of their effects is forthwith universal. Never 



