THE PRACTICAL CHARACTER OF REALITY 251 



criterion for evaluating the realities and truths of actual experi- 

 ence. No actual judgment as to the real nature of anything 

 ever was or will be found true or false by comparison with the 

 standard of an absolutely completed knowledge. For the pur- 

 poses of actual thought, the real nature of any individual never 

 can mean what it is as determined by its relations to all other 

 things in the universe. For so to extend the meaning of 'indi- 

 vidual' is to deprive it of all significance; just as the similar ex- 

 tension of the idea of 'cause' deprives it of significance. And 

 if it be urged by the absolute idealist that the realities and truths 

 of human thought must by the philosopher be judged neither 

 real nor unreal, true nor false, but as representing degrees of re- 

 ality and truth ; the reply is that the absolute mind with its real- 

 ity and truth is separated by an infinite gap from human thought, 

 and that the former can be no measure of degrees in the latter, 

 just as an infinite straight line can be no meaure of the lengths 

 of finite straight lines. 



In short, from the standpoint of instrumentalism, reality and 

 truth as defined by absolute idealism are merely limiting con- 

 ceptions; and, like the limiting conceptions of mathematics and 

 mechanics, they must be criticised both as displaying irreconcila- 

 ble self-contradictions and as failing to represent the concrete 

 facts of actual experience. But this is not to assert that when 

 their limitations are recognized they are not effective instruments 

 of analysis. Take the case of the pulley for example. As a 

 pulley is defined by mechanics, the cord must be perfectly flexi- 

 ble and the wheel on which it runs perfectly frictionless. Only 

 when these conditions are fulfilled have we, from the standpoint 

 of pure science, a real pulley. Suppose a pragmatist mechanic 

 to reply: "Not so. The flexible cords and frictionless wheels 

 of pure mechanics are sheer abstractions. If you would under- 

 stand what a pully really is, observe the ropes and wheels that 

 men use in actual life, these are real pulleys." To such a 

 criticism of the definitions of pure mechanics the reply is obvious ; 

 for the definitions of mechanics do, indeed, represent the outcome 



