38 CONTROL OF RENTS 



of error would be allowed in favor of the tenant ; but 

 as nearly as it was practicable to determine the econo- 

 mic rent, without risk of a mistake injuring the tenant, 

 the full economic rent would be allowed to the landlord. 

 It may be urged, if the principle of governmental fixation 

 on rents is admitted at all, that fixation at approxi- 

 mately the economic rent has two advantages : (1) it 

 will not be necessary in practice to apply it to all 

 estates, but only to those where greedy landlords are 

 endeavoring to force up rents above the economic level, 

 thereby occasioning ruin to successive tenants, who are 

 unwise enough to pay the rent demanded. On ordinary 

 estates managed in a conservative spirit it would not be 

 necessary to bring the fixation into actual operation ; (2) 

 Rents being settled at approximately the level of economic 

 rent, there is no surplus to be disposed of except that 

 which goes to the landlord ; consequently the competition 

 for the use of land cannot result in various indirect 

 payments to landlords and their agents for the privilege of 

 securing a lease. Sub-letting will also be impossible for 

 the purpose of the tenant retiring to live wholly or partly 

 on the rent of a sub-tenant or on a half share of a product 

 of his labour if he be taken as a working partner. It is 

 objected to this principle of fixing at )the economic level, 

 that it has no effect in raising the economic status of the 

 tenantry, for they are still left with only such earnings as 

 are necessary to maintain themselves at the prevailing 

 standard of living. 



The alternative proposal is that rents should be fixed by 

 the State at some level which will be distinctly below the 

 economic rent of the land, thus leaving some surplus of the 

 rent the true economic rent, to be enjoyed by the 

 tenant. It will be observed that this second proposal 

 involves the fixing of rents over a far larger proportion of 



