32 



Tn my judgment the acts cannot be said to be done to make the animal more 

 serviceable for the use of man. They were done for the convenience of particular 

 individuals, and for their contingent profit, and under special conditions, and 

 under circumstances of limited and by no means general application. There are 

 some markets in England where beasts are preferred without horns, but if there 

 were other markets where, that they might be more easily fattened they were 

 preferred without eyes, would that justify or excuse any person in depriving the 

 animals of their eyes ? . . Nobody can contend that it was absolutely necessary 

 to cut off these horns, and in my view it was eminently unreasonable. . . Once 

 the cruel act is unreasonable and unnecessary — and, in my opinion, the act here is 

 both one and the other — the prosecution ought to succeed. On the facts as laid 

 before us the magistrate should have convicted. The case must, therefore, be 

 sent back to him, with the opinion of the Court that he was bound to convict, 

 and as this is a case of the first impression in this country, we shall give no costs 

 of the argument." 



Mr. Justice Andrews, in agreeing with "His Lordship, held that the dehorning 

 of cattle in the manner proved constituted an offence under the statute. 



The case was, therefore, remitted to the magistrate with this opinion. 



S. P. C. A. v. Callaghan. 



The next Irish case came before Magistrates McCarthy, Bovvlby and Everard 

 at the petty sessions, George's Cross, county Meath, on November 25, 1884. 

 Two farmers, Messrs. Callaghan and McEvoy were charged with cruelty to 

 animals, in having dehorned 13 and 16 cows respectively. The counsel for the 

 complainant (S. P. C. A.) called upon the magistrates to convict, relying upon the 

 decision in Brady v. McArgle. The magistrates stated they were bound to convict 

 in accordance with the decision quoted. They found, however, that in the case 

 of individual cattle, the operation was not improperly or unskilfully performed 

 and they would not have convicted in these cases had they not been of opinion 

 that the decision of the Exchequer Division applied and ruled every case where 

 an animal is dehorned. 



In respect of the justification relied upon by the defendants, the magistrate* 

 stated that they arrived at the conclusion that the operation increased the market- 

 able value of the animals, that it rendered them quiet and tractable and less dan- 

 gerous to man and each other, that no practice causing less pain could be substi- 

 tuted for it, and that the advantages attainable by the practice were vastly out 

 of proportion to the pain inflicted thereby, provided that the operation was skil- 

 fully performed. 



The case was then submitted to the Common Pleas Division of the High 

 Court of Justice for a decision as to whether the practice of dehorning cattle was 

 one of cruelty to animals within the meaning of the Act. On the bench were 

 Chief Justice Morris, Mr. Justice Harrison and Mr. Justice Murphy, and all three 

 concurred that the operation skilfully performed could not be held to come within 

 the meaning of the Act. 



Chief Justice M( rris in his judgment said: I am of opinion t..at dehorning 

 of cattle skilfully and properly performed is not an offence within the meaning 

 of the Act, which is directed altogether against acts of cruelty. . . . Though 

 in dehorning skilfully performed, the pain inflicted appears tome on the evidence 

 to be very temporary, yet it does appear to me to be substantial ; but looking at 

 the suffering in reference to the object with which it is inflicted it cannot in my 



