40 



found as a matter of 'fact that the operation of which they had heard so much 

 was not merely useful in the interests of the owner of the cattle, but was also 

 useful and even necessary in the interests of the beasts themselves. In these 

 circumstances it was plainly impossible to affirm that the operation was one 

 which came within the scope of the statute unless indeed it was to be held — which 

 nobody had suggested — that the statutory offence was committed by the mere 

 infliction of pain. 



The Lord Justice-Clerk said that while it was not necessary for him to express 

 an opinion he wished to say that the view he took of the case was entirely in 

 accordance with the opinions which their Lordships had expressed. 



The appeal was therefore dismissed and the decision of the inferior judge 

 affirmed. 



The Latest Decision in Britain. 



The last case that found its way to the higher court was that of Newland v. 



McDonagh, in Ireland. James McDonagh, of Carlanstown, was charged before 



two magistrates at Kells, county Meath, with having caused the horns of 26 



oxen to be cut off on the 17th of April, 1890, which, it was alleged, was cruel 



treatment within the meaning of the act for the prevention of cruelty to animals- 



The case occupied several days before the magistrates, and a large number of 



witnesses were examined. The magistrates dismissed the summons, but stated a 



case for the opinion of a higher court. The case then came before the Queen's 



Bench Division of the High Court of Justice, Ireland, consisting of the Lord 



Chief Justice, Mr. Justice O'Brien, Mr. Justice Johnson, Mr. Justice Holmes, an d 



Mr. Justice Gibson, and they delivered judgment on May 6, 1891, upholding the 



legality of the practice. 



The Lord Chief Justice, in delivering judgment, reviewed the facts as found 

 by the magistrates. In summarising the decisions already given, there were, he 

 said, ten judges who had pronounced an opinion in favor of the legality of the 

 practice, and four who held a different opinion, and if they were to have regard to 

 the reasons given in two other cases, although not cases of dehorning, arising out 

 of the same section of the Act of Parliament, the statistics of judicial opinion 

 showed that fourteen judges were in favor of the legality of the practice. This 

 court was not bound by those decisions, as there was no right of appeal from 

 them, but, of course, they would examine their reasons with the deference due to 

 distinguished tribunals. They brought an absolutely open mind to the considera- 

 tion of the subject, as none of the present tribunals had until now pronounced any 

 judicial opinion on the subject. What, then, was the test by which they were to 

 define cruelty within the meaning of the statute ? It was conceded that it must 

 be something more than the mere infliction of pain. This was obvious, as there 

 were many operations which caused great pain, but yet were perfectly lawful. 

 The Solicitor-General contended that in cases, even where the object was justifi- 

 able, it must be attain <1 by means the least painful that could reasonably be 

 employed. Mr. Justice Wightman, in Birds against Parsons, defined the cruelty 

 intended by the statute the unnecessary abuse of any animal ; and in a later case, 

 Mi - . Justice Grove defined it as unnecessary ill usage, by which the animal 

 suffered. Lord Morris, in the case before the common pleas, said he preferred this 

 hitler definition, which included two propositions, viz., that the pain must be sub- 

 stantial ami tie' suffering unnecessary. In his (the Lord Chief Justice's) judgment, 

 those definitions were substantially correct, and though there was a difference of 

 phraseology, thej^ were all substantially the same. Now, it could not with any 



