42 



determine was whether dishorning, skilfully performed, was or was not unreason- 

 able. Lord Young, in the Scotch case of Renkall v. Wilson, said the statute " did 

 not intend to interfere with human life to such an extent, or with the judgment 

 of those who were pursuing their own affairs intelligently and to the best of their 

 judgment, as the farmers in Fifeshire had been doing, although in the opinion of 

 others more numerous than themselves they might be mistaken." These observa- 

 tions applied with considerably more force to Ireland. The practice of dishorning 

 was far more widely prevalent in Ireland than in Scotland. In his judgment the 

 present prosecution was not within the scope and provisions of the Act of Parlia- 

 ment. To attempt to apply it to a case where it was sought to suppress a method 

 of carrying on their business sanctioned by the great body of the representatives 

 of the principal industry of this pastoral country would, in his opinion, be to do 

 that which was never contemplated by the statute or legislature. For these 

 reasons be was of opinion that the magistrates were correct in point of law in 

 dismissing the case, and that the respondent should have his costs. 



Mr. Justice O'Brien, concurring in the judgment of the other members of the 

 court that the decision of the action of the magistrates was right, and that the 

 prosecution should be dismissed, observed that with all that could be said on 

 behalf of the practice of dishorning, its alleged necessity, and the fanciful millions 

 that would be lost to the country if it were stopped, he could not personally 

 deliver his mind from the uneasy consciousness that it was, after all, a brutaJ 

 business, with which some persons would have no concern for the world, and that 

 it was an invasion upon the rightful dominion which man had received over 

 animals, carrying with it a commission not less of mercy than of power towards 

 the humble servants of his will, in virtue of which he was appointed to be their 

 master and not their cruel tyrant. . He was of opinion, however, that the statute 

 had not declared that dishorning bona fide for the purpose of increasing the 

 value of the cattle was a practice that should be prevented. 



Mr. Justice Johnson said it was their duty merely to determine whether the 

 magistrates had correctly decided the case in point of law, and in his opinion 

 they had. 



Mr. Justice Holmes held that the operation referred to in the summons in this 

 case was not an act of cruelty within the meaning of the Act. The pain caused 

 by dishorning was not greater, perhaps, than that to which human beings were in 

 the habit of voluntarily submitting themselves for the purpose of altering and 

 improving a feature or the form of a limb. 



Mr. Justice Gibson also held that the justices had evidence to justify the 

 decision at which they had arrived. That being the case, it was not his province 

 to go behind their findings on the facts. 



Judgment was accordingly entered for the respondent, with the costs of the 

 case stated. 



Counsel for the appellant — The Solicitor-General, Mr. G. V. Hart, Q.C., and 

 Mr. W. P. Ball (instructed by Mr. George Keogh). For the respondent — Messrs. 

 Walker, Q.C., Ross, Q.C., and Kenny, M.P. (instructed by Messrs. Reeves & Son). 



Legal Cases Reviewed. 



It will be observed that the question of dehorning has been adjudicated upon 

 by twenty eminent judges of Great Britain, in addition to a large number of 

 lower magistrates. The subject was argued in all its bearings, and as a result we 

 find that sixteen judges declared the practice to be legal, while four judges pro- 

 nounced it to be illegal. In the United States, although several prosecutions 

 have taken place they have in each instance ended in acquittal. In Canada in 

 minor courts, there have been two acquittals and one conviction. 



