in] Tlie Triunity of Personality 89 



an other for me. For the moment it became part of 

 myself, while it subserved my purposes. My indwelling 

 and my freedom being completed in affection, united my 

 cognition and my conation, making it possible for me 

 as one personal being to influence my son, another per- 

 sonal being. Without this I could not have influenced 

 him at all. Thus it would seem that the affection or 

 emotion is, not freedom itself, but the index of freedom. 

 Through emotion, cognition is linked with conation. 

 Without emotion there would be no unity in our mental 

 life. Incoming tides of cognition would sweep over us; 

 and outgoing tides of conation ; related to each other 

 only as stimulus and response : unrelated to any self. 

 They are unified, and the personality is completed and 

 made free, in the sense of being truly purposive and 

 not merely causative, by affection. 



It is because I am one and free through my emotion, 

 in spite of my conation and cognition being per se, and 

 ideally, independent activities, that I can influence other 

 people and things. For cognition and conation are in 

 a certain degree, though not wholly, independent. I can 

 perceive and correlate without any externally creative 

 impulse following, as when I lie among the heather and 

 drink in the beauty of the hills, the sea, the rocks 1 . I can 

 will and create without the stimulus of immediate cog- 

 nition, calling up memories on which to base my crea- 

 tion say, of fresh plans for my children in the dark 

 and with closed eyes, by linking conation with emotion. 

 Though cognition and conation are respectively pre- 

 dominant in these two cases, emotion is clearly present 

 in each, and really, some trace of the third activity. In 

 actual practice every mental process of a self includes 

 all three activities, though one may predominate. Only 

 in lunatics and possibly in babies do we get anything 



1 Conation is, however, present in a subordinate degree, since 

 the claim of the thing perceived is endorsed by the. will, cf. p. 92. 



