96 The Triunity of Personality [CH. 



question whether these really represent three persons, 

 or three aspects, in the Godhead; and what is the re- 

 lation of these infinites of Godhead to the finites of 

 humanity. 



Now it is clear that the three heads under which the 

 philosopher considers personality are essentially the 

 same as those of the psychologist. These last are 

 narrower, for psychology is a descriptive science, and 

 has little concern with the ultimate reality which is the 

 goal of philosophy. Nevertheless philosophy, whatever 

 its final purpose, must start from the known. Thus, 

 when the philosopher reasons about personality, his 

 starting-point must be the descriptive analysis of the 

 psychologist. 



Remarking only that conation, cognition, and affec- 

 tion are included in the wider categories of will, intel- 

 lect, and emotion, we may therefore pass on to con- 

 sider the relation of these three with fatherhood, sonship 

 and indwelling spirithood. 



We have seen that conation and will are essentially 

 creative in function. They are always directed towards 

 an 'other,' and they only rise to the full height of 

 realisation when that 'other' is a person. Thus the 

 creative aspect of will is essentially fatherhood in its 

 relation to others. But into every act of fatherhood 

 intellect and emotion enter, as we have seen. Father- 

 hood is absolutely inseparable from these. 



Again cognition and intellect form the basis of pure 

 thought. You cannot think without an ' other ' which is 

 there to be thought. And the process of thinking an 

 other involves the perception of its existence, and the 

 recognition of the fact that its relation to the thinker 

 is apprehensible in the category of order or reason, and 

 not of chaos. But to think a thing is not an end-in- 

 itself. The thought must be purposive, and so related 

 to creation, and must also be the realisation of a bond 



