m] The Triunity of Personality 97 



between the thinker and the thing thought. Thought 

 thus mediates between will, on the one hand, the realisa- 

 tion of relationship on the other hand, and the thing as 

 the object of this will and this relationship. In other 

 words, the dependence of thought on will, and the 

 relationship between subject and object which both im- 

 ply, is implicitly recognised. Thought mediates between 

 will and relationship, in the directedness of each upon 

 the object of that will and relationship. If the object 

 is a person B, A being the thinker and wilier, there is 

 further the consciousness that each of these factors is 

 also present in that person B directed upon A. Finally, 

 as dependent primarily on cognition, so long as there 

 is any external other, and determining conation, but also 

 proceeding both from the thought and the will, is an 

 emotion. In this emotion the purpose both of the will 

 and the thought is to be found. It unites the two in a 

 common bond of sympathy, and without it both would 

 be meaningless, because purposeless. Ultimately, pure 

 emotion is a free cause 1 , itself governed by no relation 

 of external causality nor rational sequence, even though 

 in the experience of a limited being in his relation to 

 external objects no doubt it is true to say that sensation 

 precedes and gives rise to emotion. But even here the 

 emotion is not caused by the sensation, though it is 

 aroused by this. A blow from a stick does not cause 

 1 This statement is unaffected by the fact that in a limited 

 human personality, emotion is dependent on afferent impulses to 

 a large extent, and not entirely on internal states determined 

 solely by the nature of the personality. We shall discuss this 

 more in detail when we consider Freud's psychology. At present 

 we need only say that the apparent dependence of emotion in man 

 upon external causation is simply the evidence and result of that 

 emotion not being free. It is the mark of limitation. How sugges- 

 tive this is in regard to the self-limitation of God in creation, is 

 at once obvious. It shows how self-limitation must involve 

 suffering. To this we shall return. 



M P. 7 



