in] The Triunity of Personality 103 



tive; itself uncaused, yet perfected by mutuality. 

 When that mutuality is incomplete, the 'other' is 

 known as a limitation ; and the sense that the emotion's 

 freedom is not perfect, is felt as painful yearning. The 

 love is limited from without, and so in a sense experi- 

 ences external causation. But perfect love is an emotion 

 of transcendence. 



Thus we see that an emotion is ideally uncaused, 

 though in our own actual experience it is intimately 

 connected with the nexus of causality. It is the self- 

 expression of freedom. In the region of emotion freedom 

 is introduced into will and thought alike, because in the 

 region of emotion we find the motive of creative activity. 

 Without it, will would be simple, purposeless causation; 

 thought would be blank, miserable order alone. It 

 enters into each, supplies the lack of each, and unites 

 both together. It indwells each, and so indwelling, 

 unites them. Furthermore, when the external object, 

 that is thought and willed and felt, is personal, the 

 emotion may rise to the height of love or perfect mutu- 

 ality of communion, for the object is itself then subject, 

 and the first subject, object also. Love is the only 

 emotion that is perfectly free, and it only when it is the 

 sole emotion; and love expresses the reality of perfect 

 communion. 



Thus we see that when we pursue the ideas of will, 

 intellect, and emotion to their source we find they are 

 identical with our original concepts of fatherhood, son- 

 ship, and spirithood. 



It would, however, seem that these are merely aspects 

 of personality. They are very different from moods, it 

 is true. A mood is the partial expression of a personality 

 through the purposeful suppression of another integral 

 part, one part thus receiving over-emphasis at the ex- 

 pense of another. A mood is really the refusal to share 

 with another person the whole of our nature. We 



