222 The Evolution Hypothesis. 



we reject, as inconsistent with what consciousness 

 itself testifies, this theory of a unit of consciousness 

 corresponding to a nervous shock. Whether violent 

 or gentle, nervous shocks have reality to me, as a fact 

 of my experience, in no other way than by my con- 

 sciousness of them. "I know, I desire, I feel. 

 What is it that is common to all these ? Knowing 

 -and desiring and feeling are not the same, and may 

 be distinguished. But they all agree in one funda- 

 mental condition. Can I know, without knowing, that 

 I know ? Can I desire, without Jmoiuing, that I desire ? 

 Can I feel, without knowing, that I feel ? This is im- 

 possible. Now this knowing that I know, or desire, 

 |>r feel, this common condition of self-knowledge is 

 precisely what is denominated consciousness."* 



Whether I perceive, or feel, or will, whatever be 

 the mode of experience of which I have direct know- 

 ledge, consciousness forms its primary element. To 

 search for a unit of consciousness is to assume that 

 there is some elementary form of consciousness which 

 can be distinguished and dealt with as a distinct and 

 definable part of the whole. It is to ignore the fact 

 that consciousness is essentially cognitive and is in 

 every case the same. To be conscious that I feel is 

 the same in respect of consciousness as to be conscious 

 that I will. The consciousness itself cannot be broken 

 up into units : it is identical in all forms of experience. 



* Sir W. Hamilton's Lectures, Metaphysics, Vol. I., p. 158. 



