The Evolution of Mind. 227 



Like feelings must, then, be parted by an interval of 

 time an interval sufficient to discriminate the one 

 feeling from the other. An insuperable difficulty now 

 comes into view. How is this interval to be bridged 

 over ? The feeling that has just vanished cannot do it ; 

 for it has ceased to be : the new feeling cannot help ; 

 for it has not yet come into being : the waves of mole- 

 cular motion are of no avail ; for the one wave has 

 ceased and the other has not arisen : the organism 

 cannot accomplish the transition ; for it can only 

 make itself felt by a new wave, with its inner face of 

 feeling. This, feeling, again is either like or unlike 

 those in the original relation. If like, it runs into 

 continuity with them, and the three merge into one : 

 if unlike, we have then to compare feelings that are 

 dissimilar, a second series of difficulties present them- 

 selves, and we are no nearer the relation sought. We 

 are, of course, precluded from introducing something 

 having consciousness of both waves of molecular 

 change, and so knowledge of the resemblance ; for 

 that would be to introduce Mind, which has yet to be 

 built up of feelings and relations of feelings. 



Once more the evolutionist is at fault. In his 

 hypothesis there is no place for knowledge of the 

 likeness of successive like feelings. 



Take now the occurrence of dissimilar waves and 

 concomitant dissimilar feelings. Suppose one feeling 

 to be followed by a second of unlike quality ; in which 

 case the feelings may come together without a dividing 



