The Evolution of Mind. 229 



But how is this part of the feeling felt as a dis- 

 tinguishable shock ? It is absurd to imagine that the 

 initial portion of a feeling could feel the shock arising 

 on the coming of itself into being. It may be main- 

 tained, however, that the feeling sought is not the 

 initial moment of the second feeling, but the passage 

 from the first to the second. We ask, then, what is 

 that which passes from the one feeling to the other ? 

 What is it that feels the transition ? Not the first 

 feeling ; for it does not pass into the second it ends 

 as the second begins : if it passed into the second 

 the result would be continuity of feeling and a 

 shock could not arise : not the nerve-thrills ; for 

 these have their inner faces in the related feelings, 

 and to change the relation of the thrills would be to 

 change the relation of the feelings : not the organism ; 

 for it cannot pass consciously from feeling to feeling 

 except by a nerve-thrill and its corresponding feeling ; 

 in which case this feeling must also be brought into 

 relation to that preceding and following, and the 

 original difficulty recurs. 



We make no advance by supposing the case of 

 related feelings that are co-existent. If the feelings 

 are alike and co-existent, they are indistinguishable ; 

 they merge in one. If they are unlike, the old diffi- 

 culty reappears. " The requisite to the existence of a 

 relation is the occurrence of a change .... implying 

 the momentary shock produced by the commencement 

 of a new state." To call up the feeling of relation 



