230 The Evolution Hypothesis. 



there must be " the commencement of a new state ; " 

 that is, there must be a transition from the one feeling 

 to the other. But this passage from the one state to 

 the other implies an order of succession, and we are 

 involved in exactly the same perplexities as before. 



The evolutionist is again face to face with an in- 

 soluble problem : he cannot account for the knowledge 

 of relations. Feelings are related ; but these relations 

 can become a part of knowledge no otherwise than 

 by being known. Molecular action and concomitant 

 feelings will not yield known relations. We must 

 postulate something, call it what you will, having 

 the faculty of comparing and taking knowledge of 

 like and unlike, of equality and difference, of greater 

 and less. 



SECTION V. 

 REASONING. 



We have seen that the evolutionist cannot on his 

 hypothesis obtain the feelings out of which he pro- 

 poses to create mind ; and given the feelings, he cannot 

 account for the knowledge of their relations. But let 

 us suppose that this fatal blank is filled up ; he is still 

 only at the beginning of his task : he must now, out 

 of feelings and relations of feelings, frame intelligence 

 and build up the whole edifice of reasoned thought. 



" Reasoning is but a formation of cohesions among 



