The Evolution Hypothesis. 



In dealing with this subject, Mr. Spencer is not so 

 lucid in his exposition as is his wont : he writes like 

 one carefully guarding against difficulties. The know- 

 ledge of self and not-self he classes among the intui- 

 tions which must be accepted provisionally" Those 

 fundamental intuitions that are essential to the process 

 of thinking " and that " must be temporarily accepted 

 -as unquestionable, leaving the assumption of their 

 unquestionableness to be justified by the results." * 

 We are quite willing to grant that the fundamental 

 intuitions "are to be accepted" as unquestionable; but 

 to do so is fatal to evolution as a doctrine to be held 

 true universally ; for the evolutionist is bound to find 

 the place of these fundamental truths, as they arise of 

 necessity in that universal movement which the evo- 

 lution hypothesis undertakes to formulate. Results 

 may justify the intuition, but cannot justify the 

 evolutionist. The intuition is called as a witness 

 against him : its absolute veracity only renders its 

 adverse testimony the more damaging. 



While classing it with fundamental intuitions, Mr. 

 Spencer speaks of the cognition of the ego as "a 

 primordial product of consciousness " ( "a cumulative 

 result of persistent consciousness of likeness and 

 differences among manifestations ; " J that is, he dis- 

 tinguishes between consciousness and consciousness of 

 self, and regards the latter as resulting from conscious- 



* First Principles, 39. t Ibid., 45. J Ibid., 44. 



