The Evohition of Mind. 239 



differences are found in every part of nature. Their 

 existence is co-extensive with concrete being. Each 

 thing is either like or unlike every other. It is 

 evident, then, that the emphasis is to be laid on the 

 word knoivable. The possibility of our knowing these 

 likenesses and differences is the real thing postulated ; 

 in which case the assumption is of man's ability to 

 know the like and the unlike ; that is, the evolutionist 

 grounds his " fundamental cognition " on the possession 

 by man of a faculty of comparison. He must find a 

 power of comparing like and unlike, and of classifying 

 objects accordingly, prior to the differentiation of con- 

 sciousness into consciousness of self. Given an un- 

 knowable power, and given a faculty of comparing 

 and classifying, there will follow " a resulting segrega- 

 tion of the manifestations into those of subject and 

 object." But what the power is by which this segre- 

 gation is effected is left undefined. Elsewhere we are 

 told that " the manifestations of the unknowable fall 

 into the two separate aggregates," and again it is said 

 that " strictly speaking it is in great part spontaneous." 

 Mindful of Mr. Spencer's repudiation of everything 

 like spontaneity, we are somewhat puzzled to fix the 

 exact meaning ; for " the very conception of sponta- 

 neity is wholly incongruous with the conception of 

 evolution."* Nor are we helped by learning that "it 

 is a legitimate deliverance of consciousness elaborating 



* Biology, Vol.* I., Appendix, p. 480. 



