The Evolution of Mind. 245 



he lives, is able to reduce its varied phenomena to 

 order in his thought. 



SECTION VII. 



INNATE PRINCIPLES. 



The Evolution Hypothesis cannot admit the exist- 

 ence in man of a source of intellectual and moral 

 power, intimately united to, but not identical with, 

 the sentient organism, having relation to its en- 

 vironment by means of the organism through which 

 it affects and is affected by the external world. If 

 man be constituted with a dual nature mental and 

 physical he cannot have arisen in an unbroken 

 course of cosmic mutation. It is essential, therefore, 

 to evolutionism to account for his mental faculties, and 

 for those axiomatic truths which are accepted by 

 reason as soon as their terms are understood, in a way 

 that will prove congruous with the supposed ceaseless 

 dynamic process. 



The mode in which the evolutionist deals with our 

 knowledge of the external world is a crucial instance 

 of his treatment of the question. Rejecting what are 

 called faculties of the mind, he interprets the rela- 

 tion of consciousness to the surrounding universe from 

 a quite different point of view. According to Mr. 

 Spencer the gradual evolution of organs, becoming 

 more and more perfectly adjusted, is accompanied by 

 the gradual formation of correspondences between 



