The Evolution of Mind. 247 



with sensibility, and affected by a wave of molecular 

 motion, is indispensable on the other, that in the 

 combined result there may be experienced what we 

 may regard either as a sensation or a percept as a 

 sensation, if the sense element is predominant in con- 

 sciousness, as a percept if the intellectual prevail. In 

 this case, and the same criticism holds good through- 

 out, Mr. Spencer pushes into the background the 

 primary mental characteristic knowing. He groups 

 units of feeling, and constructs an objective world 

 in this fashion in thought : but he loses sight of the 

 fact that to know is the first and most distinctive 

 attribute of mind. 



Passing from the discussion of these inborn modes 

 of composite action displayed in the cognition of 

 external objects, and in the higher exercises of in- 

 telligence operating on the materials furnished in 

 sensation, we proceed to inquire how evolution deals 

 with those attributes of mind, which the intuitionist 

 holds to be essential to all reasoning, innate principles 

 not derived from without, not generated by experi- 

 ence, brought by the mind with it as it comes into 

 existence the law 'of its distinctive form of being. 

 These primary intuitions, operative without conscious- 

 ness of them, when analyzed and formulated, are 

 axiomatic truths a priori synthetic judgments. The 

 experientialist denies that there are such principles 

 native to intelligence ; affirming that these axioms are 

 nothing more than generalizations from a uniform 



