274 The Evolution Hypothesis. 



moral quality of the action is its tendency to pro- 

 duce agreeable or painful sensations. 



It is clear no moral teaching could spring from the 

 evolution hypothesis except the ethics of pleasure. 

 Out of the primordial homogeneity no other doctrine 

 could be evolved. Is 'it a sound theory of life? Is 

 there nothing better within the range of human experi- 

 ence than pleasure, and nothing worse than pain ? Is 

 the good nothing more than that which imparts enjoy- 

 ment ? and is the essence of evil that it entails suf- 

 fering ? 



The whole question will appear in a different light 

 if we approach it from the opposite standpoint : if we 

 hold that there is that in man which is in its nature 

 moral that which is capable of moral growth or 

 decay, of being perfected or debased. The moral attri- 

 butes of mind give man a sovereignty over agreeable 

 or painful sensations : pleasure is not to him the very 

 substance of his life the form of moral intuition. 

 The relations of experience are still further modified if 

 we cherish belief in a future state. Weal and woe are 

 not measurable within the limits of the present world : 

 there are results that do not lie within the visible ; 

 and the hedonist computation of the worth of actions 

 is manifestly false. The broken life is perfected : the 

 seemingly complete is seen to be defective. In the 

 hope of another life, all things appear in a new light. 



Mr. Spencer has in his ethics, as in his sociology, 

 presented many questions of conduct in a novel and 



