278 The Evolution Hypothesis. 



and this inability to think creation "is immediately 

 consequent on the nature of thought." 



It would be easy to turn the edge of Mr. Spencer's- 

 criticism upon himself. The relation which he sub- 

 stitutes for that of Creator and creature, is no more 

 thinkable. It is as difficult to represent in thought 

 the relation of noumenon and phenomenon, reality and 

 appearance, absolute cause and conditioned effect, as it 

 is to conceive of " God, the Father Almighty, maker 

 of heaven and earth." 



But there is an obvious fallacy in assuming that 

 no conception can be thought unless it can be repre- 

 sented to the mind in an image or other sensible form. 

 Nothing could be more completely unfounded than 

 this assumption. A great part of the matter of 

 thinking, and above all of exact thinking, is such 

 that it cannot be presented to consciousness in any 

 visual or sensible mode. Mr. Spencer's test would 

 remove from the range of knowledge all relations of 

 relations ; none of which can become objects of con- 

 sciousness by an image or " mental representation of 

 the thing." It is as impossible to conceive a point, or 

 a line, or the millionth power of six, or the equality 

 of ratios, as to conceive not-being. Mr. Spencer's- 

 criterion would also exclude from thought all concep- 

 tion of mind. Here is an object of knowledge of 

 which we cannot form any " mental representation ; " 

 yet men reason with precision, taking mind, or a 

 faculty of mind, as one of the terms. Abstractions 





