Creation. 289 



tion of mind ; he seeks a key to the problem in thought. 

 Wherever he sees existences differenced as a new kind 

 he finds a special creation : that which was not and 

 now is, is as a new manifestation of divine intelligence 

 and power. It matters nothing at what moment in, 

 time this kind may have come to be ; it matters not 

 what was antecedent to it, or at what point of contact 

 it touched the forms of being already existent, or how 

 close its kinship to them : what the creationist sees is 

 a new manifestation of the all-comprehending mind ; 

 in so far as the conception is separate or special, he 

 sees in it a special creation. 



But the evolutionist will urge that the question for 

 science is the mode of the divine operation on the side 

 of the phenomenal. There has been a visible embodi- 

 ment ; show us, he may say, what was before and 

 after, and its relation to what has preceded, that we 

 may discover the outward and sensible effect. When,, 

 for example, a dog first came into existence, picture to 

 us the process. The creationist replies that he cannot. 

 There are no materials to enable him to do so. The 

 scanty records of the past do not warrant any definite 

 representation of the fact. He cannot trace the 

 history of any living thing back to the moment when 

 it emerged within the visible in its primal form. But 

 the evolutionist is in no better case ; he is equally at 

 fault. He has not been able to show in any satis- 

 factory manner the powers of nature at work in 

 originating any given species. How the primordial 



