Summary and Conclusion. 297 



confutation. It must, however, be kept in view that, 

 proceeding from well established scientific truths, the 

 hypothesis carries with it the apparent sanction of 

 physical science. It is necessary, therefore, to bring 

 it to the test of criticism. This I have endeavoured 

 to do in the foregoing discussion. How far the argu- 

 is valid and effective it is for the reader himself to 

 judge. The sum of it is this : 



We have challenged the aim of the evolutionist, as 

 transcending the limits of intelligence and inconsis- 

 tent with the nature of the objects with which 

 intelligence is conversant. His hypothesis is, we 

 maintain, from the outset, illegitimate, as attempting 

 an impossible task the bringing of all concrete being 

 and its activities within a single formula, and that 

 formula derived from one department of experience. 

 Examining the limits of physical science and natural 

 law, we have seen that they do not furnish material 

 for constructing a system of universal truth. We 

 have discussed Mr. Spencer's doctrine of the unknow- 

 able and the knowable, and have argued that it 

 renders his philosophy nugatory, and reduces his 

 hypothesis to a mere unprovable guess. We have 

 seen that to bring the moral and the physical the 

 soul and the world together under one regulative 

 principle, and constitute them parts of one process, 

 all concrete existences and all activities must be 

 embraced within the compass of dynamic law. We 

 have disputed this narrowing of existence within 



