225 



livery in the vendor's stable, or whether they had 

 been taken away and put in some other stable. 



It is clear from this case, that the buyer was 

 acknowledged to possess the power of disposition, 

 and the horses, by their removal into the livery 

 stable, were intended to be subject to his order and 

 control ; this therefore, was a delivery, although 

 the seller did not in point of fact give up the actual 

 possession of the goods sold. 



The next case to which I shall refer, will appear 

 to an unprofessional reader to be somewhat incon- 

 sistent with the former ; but, on the contrary, the 

 authority of Elmore v. Stone, is expressly recog- 

 nized. The difference between the two cases is 

 fine, but may be collected from the observations of 

 the Chief Justice about to be cited. 



1 Dowling and Ryland, 515, Carter v. Touissant. 

 — " Plaintiff sold a horse to the defendant at the 

 price of £30 by parole agreement ; the horse to be 

 fired, and remain in plaintiff's possession until fit 

 to be sent to grass ; at the end of twenty-two days 

 the horse was, by defendant's direction, taken to 

 graze at Kimpton park, and there entered in the 

 plaintiff's name : it was held that there was no 

 delivery to, or acceptance of the horse by the de- 

 fendant, to satisfy the 17th section of the statute 

 of frauds." 



Q 



