230 



the goods, within the meaning of the 17th section 

 of the statute. 



Here however, I collect that the bargain was 

 not one and entire, but for the part removed as 

 distinct and separate from the bulk. 



The acceptance of goods by the buyer must be 

 clear and unequivocal ; and a constructive accept- 

 ance will not be sufficient, (See Nicholle v. Plume, 

 1 Carrington and Payne, 272.) And in another 

 case of Tempest v. Fitzgerald, 3 Barnewell and 

 Alderson, 680, the necessity of a clear acceptance 

 seems yet more decidedly laid down. A agreed 

 to purchase a horse from B for ready money, and 

 to fetch him away on a given day. Two days 

 before that day A rode the horse, and gave direc- 

 tions as to his exercise and future treatment ; but 

 requested that he might remain in B's possession 

 for a further time, at the expiration of which he 

 promised to fetch him away and pay the price ; 

 the horse died before A paid the price, or took 

 him away ; it was held that there was no acceptance 

 of the horse, so as to make the bargain executed 

 within the meaning of the statute. 



A delivery to a party named by the purchaser is 

 a delivery within the statute ; and so is a delivery, 

 without special directions, to a carrier where the 

 purchaser has been in the habit of receiving goods 



