244 



previous decision of the same judge, in the case of 

 Fleming v. Simpson, which will be found in a note 

 1 Camp. 40, though the cases are clearly distin- 

 guishable. 



I will further illustrate this principle, by a simple 

 case. If a man applies to a dealer for a horse to 

 draw his carriage, and the dealer sells him a horse 

 unused to harness, and consequently unsafe, the 

 dealer is liable for the breach of his implied war- 

 ranty, and for all damages sustained in consequence; 

 hence the purchaser might not only recover back 

 the price which he had paid, but compensation for 

 any injury done by the horse to his carriage, or 

 his person. 



But this kind of implied engagement relates to 

 the fitness of the article for its purpose, rather than 

 its goodness or soundness. Besides, it is not often 

 practicable to give satisfactory evidence of the 

 exact intercourse between the parties on the sale of 

 the goods, especially in the case of horses ; hence, 

 a purchaser is generally unwilling to be satisfied 

 with an implied engagement, depending on the 

 vendor's knowledge of the purpose for which the 

 animal is required. He therefore exacts an express 

 undertaking as to the quality of soundness, and 

 such an undertaking is called a warranty. 



Though the word " warranty" applies to such 



