255 



Reports, 51 ; and it will be observed, that it goes 

 so far as to make a third party liable for fraudulent 

 deceit, even though he derives no benefit, and even 

 though there is no collusion between that third 

 party and the vendor. 



" A false affirmation made by the defendant, with 

 intent to defraud the plaintiff, whereby the plain- 

 tiff receives damage, is the ground of an action 

 upon the case in the nature of deceit. In such an 

 action, it is not necessary that the defendant should 

 be benefited by the deceit, or that he should collude 

 with the person who is." 



In vindicating his opinion, Mr. J. Grose says, 

 " Suppose a person present at the sale of a horse, 

 asserts that he was his horse, and that he knows 

 him to be sound and surefooted, when in fact, the 

 horse is neither the one nor the other, according 

 to the principle contended for by the plaintiffs, 

 an action lies against the person present, as well 

 as the seller ; and the purchaser has two secu- 

 rities." Mr. Justice Grose put this hypothetical 

 case, to illustrate the unreasonableness of the 

 principle^ that a stranger to a contract incurred a 

 personal responsibility to a purchaser by a false 

 representation in favour of the seller. The principle, 

 however, was nevertheless adopted by Justices 

 BuUer and Ashurst, and by the chief justice, Lord 



