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Kenyon ; and I shall quote some of the remarks 

 made by Mr. Justice BuUer, because they veiy 

 clearly and concisely explain the principle of the 

 action for deceit. " I agree," said his lordship, 

 " that an action cannot be supported, for telling a 

 bare, naked lie ; but that I define to be, saying a 

 thing which is false, knowing or not knowing it to 

 be so, and without any design to inj ure, cheat, or 

 deceive another person. Every deceit comprehends 

 a lie j but a deceit is more than a lie, on account of 

 the view with which it is practised : its being cou- 

 pled with some dealing, and the injury which it is 

 calculated to occasion, and does occasion to another 

 person." His lordship then quotes some reported 

 cases, and proceeds, "These cases then, are so far 

 from being authorities against the present action, 

 that they show, that if there be fraud or deceit, 

 the action will lie; and that knowledge of the false- 

 hood of the thing asserted is fraud and deceit : 

 collusion then, is not necessary to constitute fraud. 

 In the case of a conspiracy, there must be collusion 

 between two or more, to support an indictment ; 

 but if one man alone be guilty of an offence, which, 

 if practised by two, would be the subject of an 

 indictment for a conspiracy, he is civilly liable in 

 an action for reparation of damages, at the suit of 

 the person injured." 



