268 



on this case, it is observed, that the written war- 

 ranty of a horse does not require an agreement 

 stamp, and had been admitted in evidence although 

 not on a stamp. This point is decided in Skrine 

 V, Elmore, 2 Camp. 407. 



I have already alluded to the next case, but the 

 authority of Mr. Justice Bayley is so strong, that 

 I must quote the case at length. 



Wood V. Smith, 4 Carr. and P., 45. — " The gene- 

 ral rule is, that whatever a seller represents at the 

 time of sale, is a warranty. A warranty may be 

 either general or qualified. If a person at the 

 time of his selling a horse say, * I never warrant ;' 

 but he is sound as far as I ' know ;' this is a 

 qualified warranty, and the purchaser may main- 

 tain assumpsit upon it, if he can show that the 

 horse was unsound to the knowledge of the seller." 



It should be noticed, that the words used go 

 rather farther than they are above quoted in the 

 marginal note of the case. The defendant said, 

 " She is sound to the best of my knowledge : I 

 never warrant ; I would not even warrant myself." 



It was objected that this was no warranty, but 

 that the action should have been for deceit ; and 

 Mr. Gurney relied on Williamson and Allison, 2 

 East, 446, and Dobell v. Stevens, 5 D. and R. 490 ; 

 but Mr. J. Bayley held on the motion for a rule 



