269 



tiisij that " whatever a person represents at the 

 time of a sale is a warranty/' 



I must express a respectful doubt whether this 

 dictum does not go too far. 



There is a strong case on the point in 3 M. and 

 R., 2 : it is the case of Cave v, Coleridge, where it 

 was held that a " verbal representation of the seller 

 to the buyer in the course of the dealing, that * he 

 may depend upon it the horse is perfectly quiet 

 and free from vice,' amounts to a warranty." 



I quote the following case, because, though the 

 circumstances of the case, as it is reported, scarcely 

 amount to fraudulent representation, yet Chief 

 Justice Best lays down the law very distinctly, 

 that the representation must be known to be wrong. 



Salmon v. Ward, 2 Carr. and P. 211. — " In an 

 action on the warranty of a horse, letters passing 

 between the plaintiff and defendant, in which the 

 plaintiff writes, ^You well remember that you 

 represented the horse to me as a five-year-old,' &c. 

 to which the defendant answers, ' The horse is as 

 I represented it,' are sufficient evidence from 

 which a j ury may infer that a warranty was given 

 at the time of the sale ; and it is not necessary to 

 give other proof of what actually passed when the 

 contract w^as made." 

 ' ''I quite agree," said C. J. Best, ''that there 



