281 



if it was a recognition of the warranty, it seems 

 also to have been a recognition of the bargain to 

 take the horse back again, and return the money 

 if he was unsound. I cannot, I confess, exactly 

 understand the distinction taken by the learned 

 judge, but the niceties of pleading are not always 

 intelligible even to the initiated. 



The unsoundness in this case was that the horse 

 was a roarer. 



I refer my readers to the case of Towers v, Bar- 

 rett, 1 T, R. 133, for an elaborate argument on 

 the question of pleading alluded to above; and the 

 case of Weston v. Downs, Doug. 23, and fully 

 quoted in Selwyn's N. P., page 98, to which case 

 reference is made in Towers v, Barrett, may also 

 be properly cited. 



Another very important point, that every dealer 

 or seller must bear in mind, is, that a groom or 

 other agent employed to sell a horse, is authorized 

 to exercise a discretion in warranting him, and may 

 do so even contrary to the positive instructions of 

 his master, and fix his master with liability. The 

 following cases are very strong upon this point : — 



Helyear v. Hawke, 5 Espinasse, 72. — " Where a 

 principal employs an agent or servant to sell for 

 him, what such agent says as a warranty or repre- 

 sentation at the time of the sale, respecting the 



