288 



inference which its author draws from it, confirms 

 the importance of the principle which I have here 

 presumed to lay down. He observes that " it will 

 not impeach the warranty, if the purchaser can 

 only produce doubtful evidence of unsoundness, 

 even of proper judges." 



That this inference is sustained by the authority 

 I do not deny: but in my judgment the authority 

 is itself questionable. That it is a question for the 

 court above, whether a verdict is against evidence, 

 no lawyer will dispute, but what is the value of 

 doubtful evidence is entirely a question for a jury, 

 assuming that the doubt is not one of admissi- 

 bility ; and therefore, if a jury decides that the 

 fact of unsoundness is established, inasmuch as 

 they are the judges of facts, I apprehend that 

 the court would not set aside their verdict merely 

 because the evidence was not necessarily decisive. 

 The following case, I think, bears me out in this 

 position. 



Lewis V. Peake, 7 Taunton, 153. — " The sound- 

 ness or unsoundness of a horse, is a question pecu- 

 liarly fit for the consideration of a jury, and the 

 court will not set aside a verdict for a preponder- 

 ance of contrary evidence. If the buyer of a horse 

 with warranty, relying thereon, resells him with 

 warranty, and being sued thereon, by his vendee, 



