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POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



an intellectual instinct which is in- 

 superable viz., the instinct which 

 sees the highest explanations of Na- 

 ture in the analogies of mental pur- 

 pose and direction. But" he adds, 

 ** Darwin neither saw nor admitted its 

 implications." If Darwin neither 

 saw nor admitted its implications 

 by which the writer means its teleo- 

 logical implications it was a very 

 blind instinct indeed which led him 

 to choose the term because of those 

 implications. The fact is that Dar- 

 win had little choice in the matter. 

 Human language is necessarily so 

 tinctured with the idea of purpose 

 that it is extremely difficult to find 

 terms expressive of action which do 

 not in some degree or other seem to 

 im ply purpose. Th en we are told that 

 u the great bulk of Darwin's admirers 

 rejoiced in his theory for the very 

 reason that it rested mainly on the 

 idea of fortuity." How does this agree 

 with the previous statement that the 

 success of the term u natural selec- 

 tion " was chiefly due to the glamour 

 it threw over men's minds as being 

 a kind of personification of Nature ? 

 It seems as if his Lordship had not 

 quite made up his mind as to what 

 his views really are on this point. 



We are told, not for the first time, 

 that " it would be as rational to ac- 

 count for the poem of the Iliad, or for 

 the play of Hamlet, by supposing that 

 the words and letters were adjusted 

 to the conceptions by some process 

 of natural selection, as to account by 

 the same formula for the intricate 

 and glorious harmonies of structure 

 with function in organic life." State- 

 ments of this kind, we must confess, 

 seem to us rather inept. The argu- 

 ment is: the words of the Iliad or of 

 Hamlet are so arranged as to render 

 certain meanings ; we know that 

 these words were chosen by a con- 

 scious intelligent agent ; wherever, 

 therefore, we find that any arrange- 

 ments in Nature are adapted to pro- 



duce definite effects, we are entitled 

 to conclude that those arrangements 

 also had their origin in conscious and 

 purposive effort. In other words, 

 because results are reached in one 

 case, or in certain cases, by purposive 

 efforts, they must be so in all cases. 

 Manifestly the conclusion is illicit, 

 and yet the argument is continually 

 being served up to us in essentially 

 this shape. The duke talks of the 

 " intricate and glorious harmonies " 

 of Nature, but does he rest his ar- 

 gument on harmonies of this rich 

 order ? If so, where does he draw 

 the line ? How intricate and how 

 glorious must a harmony be in order 

 to make good its claim to a purposive 

 origin? And may it be assumed that 

 humbler harmonies may be the re- 

 sult of unconscious processes ? This 

 is no trivial logic-chopping question ; 

 it is all-important. We presume, from 

 the duke's seeming to rest his argu- 

 ment on the higher harmonies, that 

 he is prepared to abandon the lower 

 to the reign of purely physical law ; 

 and if so, the believer in natural 

 selection and other evolutionary 

 formulas would like to know the ex- 

 tent of his conceded domain. Our 

 impression is that, if he once gets a 

 foot of space in the world of action 

 and reaction, no "pent-up Utica" 

 will long confine his powers. We 

 may say as much of the contrary 

 theory : once make it plain that any 

 adaptation in Nature is distinctly 

 purposive, and the dominion of pur- 

 pose will become a universal do- 

 minion. 



From our point of view, we must 

 frankly confess, the idea of purpose 

 is simply a drag on the interpretation 

 of Nature. It is one of those short 

 cuts which it does not pay to take. 

 In so far as we assume purpose we 

 cease to be interested in method or 

 process. Voluntary action only 

 comes in to do that which could not 

 be effected by involuntary action ; 



