EDITOR'S TABLE. 



4'3 



and therefore if, in tracing back any 

 chain of causation, we come to a 

 point where we conclude that vol- 

 untary action manifests itself, we do 

 not seek an explanation of that. It 

 does not follow, however, that, he- 

 cause the idea of purpose is a drag 

 on the scientific interpretation of 

 Nature, it has no place in a rational 

 scheme of thought. It is possible to 

 believe, and with deep conviction, in 

 purposes that can not be traced ; and 

 this, in our opinion, implies a more 

 truly religious spirit than the attempt 

 to read the petty thoughts of man 

 into the everlasting statutes of the 

 universe. To undertake, as the Duke 

 of Argyll does, to indicate at what 

 precise points in the sequence of 

 events there must have been the in- 

 troduction of a divine power does 

 not seem to us to be religious in the 

 best sense. At best of times we know 

 but in part ; where we know not at 

 all let us acknowledge our ignorance, 

 but let us not say that, because we 

 are ignorant, we must surely be upon 

 holier ground. 



Since the above was written, a 

 further article by the Duke of Argyll 

 in criticism of Mr. Spencer's views 

 has been given to the world; and, 

 as we have our hand in, we may as 

 well deal with it in the remaining 

 space at our disposal. The writer 

 declares very positively that we de- 

 ceive ourselves " when we think or 

 talk of organs being made or fitted 

 by use," the idea being, he says, 

 " strictly speaking nonsense," as or- 

 gans are made " for use, not by 

 use." This would be an important 

 statement if there was only the least 

 reason for believing it to be true, 

 which there is not. The distin- 

 guished disputant simply assumes 

 the conclusion which it is the pur- 

 pose of his lengthy argumentation 

 to prove. We can claim with toler- 

 able confidence to know that organs 



are formed, or have been formed, by 

 the combined action of use and nat- 

 ural selection, but we have abso- 

 lutely no knowledge in regard to 

 the deliberate formation of organs 

 for use. We can not even begin to 

 imagine what the nature of such a 

 process would be. 



The duke makes, however, a true 

 and important remark when he says 

 that " we have no antecedent knowl- 

 edge of the Creator which can pos- 

 sibly entitle us to form any pre- 

 sumption as to his methods of 

 operation." How vain, then, to say 

 that He intervenes to form organs 

 for use, creating them first in a very 

 rudimentary form, and gradually 

 improving them in the course of 

 ages ! It is because of their profound 

 conviction that the Creator's ways 

 are past finding out that they can 

 not possibly be level with the com- 

 prehension of man that evolution- 

 ists limit themselves so strictly to the 

 simple sequence and filiation of phe- 

 nomena. When the duke says that 

 he " can not accept, or even respect, 

 the opinion of men who, in describ- 

 ing the facts of Nature, use perpetu- 

 ally the language of intention, and 

 then repudiate the implications of 

 that language when they talk what 

 they call science of philosophy," he 

 overlooks the fact referred to above, 

 that as a general thing " the language 

 of intention " is chosen because none 

 other is available. When we say 

 that running water sifts earthy mat- 

 ter, we may seem to use the language 

 of intention, sifting being a definite 

 action resulting in a definite, and 

 what might look like a purposive, 

 arrangement of the materials sub- 

 jected thereto ; but surely we are 

 not required to attribute intention to 

 the running water. It is difficult to 

 please the duke, however ; he declines 

 to respect the opinions of those who 

 use the language of intention with- 

 out fully accepting all its implica- 



