THE PSYCHOLOGY OF BELIEF. 753 



of nerve and muscle, comparatively few ever produce in us sensa- 

 tion. This is matter of mere physical organization. We are con- 

 scious of a much more important selective process. We know 

 that we do choose what things we shall respond to, and what not. 

 We are now brought to see the two chief phases of belief, the 

 voluntary and the involuntary sides of it. 



Much has been said of the uncontrollable nature of belief. 

 This is no mere fancy. We do believe in an involuntary sort of 

 way, much as a child puts everything into its mouth. In fact, 

 Prof. James has said, " Whatever is uncontradicted is ipso facto 

 believed." In such a sense as this, belief is uncontrollable. But 

 the other side of the matter is more important. We may will to 

 believe that is, we may choose what we will believe and what 

 we will not believe. 



This possibility of choice depends upon two things, one sub- 

 jective, the other objective. To the former fact Prof. James 

 has already called attention in pointing out that the same 

 things may seem different to us.* My table-top, for instance, 

 will look like a rhombus, a square, or an oblong rectangle, depend- 

 ing upon the point of view. I deliberately choose to regard it as 

 a square, and in so doing ignore the other aspects, which 

 none the less remain equally true and real. The second fact 

 upon which the possibility of choice depends is a matter of 

 mental constitution. Prof. Royce gives this a very clear state- 

 ment. " We are prejudiced," he says, " in favor of regularity in 

 the world ; and so we continually manipulate the data of sense 

 for the sake of building up a notion of a regular, necessary, and 

 simple universe." Just as the sponge, again, by its constitution 

 of calcareous outer skeleton and soft inner substance, must prefer 

 to absorb from the varied materials offered by the passing current 

 lime and carbon, so we choose what we choose largely per force 

 of our racial and individual constitutions. 



" And so," continues Prof. Royce, " though it is true that our 

 knowledge of the world is determined by what is given to our 

 senses, it is equally true that our idea of the world is determined 

 quite as much by our own active combination, completion, antici- 

 pation of sense experience." f It is unnecessary to repeat the 

 arguments upon which the conclusion Prof. Royce reaches is 

 based. I have already indicated them. Because we can receive 

 more sensations than we can follow, we choose to reject some and 

 retain others, thus carrying out consciously the selective process 

 that our organization unconsciously begins. Now, what Prof. 

 Royce emphasizes is the fact that this conscious process of selec- 



* Prof. James, Principles of Psychology, vol. i, p. 285. 

 f Religious Aspect of Philosophy, p. 322. 

 VOL. LI. 66 



