The Second Book 93 



wherein I may without prejudice preserve thus much of the ^ 

 conceit of antiquity, that Physique should contemplate 

 that which is inherent in matter, and therefore transitory ; 

 and Metaphysique that which is abstracted and fixed. 

 And again, that Physique should handle that which sup- 

 poseth in nature only a being and moving; and Meta- 

 physique should handle that which supposeth further in 

 nature a reason, understanding, and platform. But the • 

 difference, perspicuously expressed, is most familiar and 

 sensible. For as we divided natural philosophy in general 

 into the inquiry of causes, and productions of effects : so that 

 part which concemeth the inquiry of causes we do sub- 

 divide according to the received and found division of 

 causes ; the one part, which is Physique, inquireth and / 

 handleth the material and efficient causes ; and the other, 

 which is Metaphysique, handleth the formal and final 

 causes} 

 4. Physique, taking it according to the derivation, and not 

 according to our idiom for medicine, is situate in a middle 

 term or distance between Natural History and Meta- 

 physique. For natural history describeth the variety 

 of things; physique, the causes, but variable or respective 

 causes; and metaphysique, the fixed and constant causes. 



Limus ut hie durescit, et haec ut cera liquescit, 

 Uno eodemque igni : » 



Fire is the cause of induration, but respective to clay; 

 fire is the cause of coUiquation, but respective to wax ; but 

 fire is no constant cause either of induration or coUiquation: 

 so then the physical causes are but the efficient and the 

 matter. Physique hath three parts; whereof two respect 

 nature united or collected, the third contemplateth nature 

 diffused or distributed. Nature is collected either into one 

 entire total, or else into the same principles or seeds. So as 

 the first doctrine is touching the contexture or configura- 

 tion of things, as de mundo, de universitate rerum. The 

 second is the doctrine concerning the principles or originals 

 of times. The third is the doctrine concerning all variety 

 and particularity of things; whether it be of the differing 



^ For these " four causes" see Arist. Post. Anal. ii. lo, i. Cf. 

 Mill's Logic, bk. iii. ch. $. 

 • \'irg. Eel. viii. 80. 



