The Second Book i 3 1 



quence, by the variations and deflections from which errors 

 and inconsequences may be exactly judged. Toward the 

 composition and structure of which form, it is incident to 

 handle the parts thereof, which are propositions, and the 

 parts of propositions, which are simple words: and this is 

 that part of Logic which is comprehended in the Analytics. 



5. The second method of doctrine was introduced for ex- 

 pedite use and assurance sake ; discovering the more subtle 

 forms of sophisms and illaqueations with their redargutions, 

 which is that which is termed clenches. For although in 

 the more gross sorts of fallacies it happeneth, as Seneca 

 maketh the comparison well, as in juggling feats, which, 

 though we know not how they are done, yet we know well 

 it is not as it seemeth to be ; ^ yet the more subtle sort of 

 them doth not only put a man beside his answer, but doth 

 many times abuse his judgment. 



6. This part concerning clenches is excellently handled by 

 Aristotle in precept, but more excellently by Plato in 

 example, not only in the persons of the Sophists, but even 

 in Socrates himself; who, professing to affirm nothing, but 

 to infirm that which was affirmed by another, hath exactly 

 expressed all the forms of objection, fallacy, and regardu- 

 tion.* And although we have said that the use of this 

 doctrine is for redargution, yet it is manifest the degenerate 

 and corrupt use is for caption and contradiction, which 

 passeth for a great faculty, and no doubt is of very great 

 advantage : though the difference be good which was made 

 between orators and sophisters, that the one is as the grey- 

 hound which hath his advantage in the race, and the other 

 as the hare which hath her advantage in the turn, so as it 

 is the advantage of the weaker creature. 



7. But yet further, this doctrine of clenches hath a more 

 ample latitude and extent than is perceived; namely, unto 

 divers parts of knowledge; whereof some are laboured and 

 others omitted. For first, I conceive, though it may seem 

 at first somewhat strange, that that part which is variably 

 referred, sometimes to logic, sometimes to metaphysics, 

 touching the common adjuncts of essences, is but an clench ; 

 for the great sophism of all sophisms being equivocation, 



* Sen. Epist. Mot. 45. Sine noxa decipiunt, quomodo praestigia- 

 torum acetabula et calculi, in quibus fallacia ipsa delectat. 



" Cf. Plato's account of Socrates in the opening of the Theatetus. 



