The Second Book 135 



the differing kinds of proofs to the differing kinds of sub- 

 jects; for there being but four kinds of demonstrations, 

 that is, by the immediate consent of the mind or sense, by in- 

 duction, by syllogism, and by 'congruity (which is that 

 which Aristotle calleth demonstration in orb or circle,^ and 

 not a notioribus ;) every of these hath certain subjects in 

 the matter of sciences, in which respectively they have 

 chief est use; and certain others, from which respectively 

 they ought to be excluded; and the rigour and curiosity 

 in requiring the more severe proofs in some things, and 

 chiefly the facility in contenting ourselves with the more 

 remiss proofs in others, hath been amongst the greatest 

 causes of detriment and hinderance to knowledge. The 

 distributions and assignations of demonstrations, accord- 

 ing to the analogy of sciences, I note as deficient. 

 XV. I. The custody or retaining of knowledge is either in writing 

 or memoi-y ; whereof writing hath two parts, the nature of 

 the character, and the order of the entry; for the art of 

 characters, or other visible notes of words or things, it 

 hath nearest conjugation with grammar; and therefore I 

 refer it to the due place : for the disposition and collocation 

 of that knowledge which we preserve in writing, it con- 

 sisteth in a good digest of common-places ; wherein I am not 

 ignorant of the prejudice imputed to the use of common- 

 place books, as causing a retardation of reading, and some 

 sloth or relaxation of memory. But because it is but a 

 counterfeit thing in knowledges to be forward and pregnant, 

 except a man be deep and full, I hold the entry of common- 

 places to be a matter of great use and essence in studying, as 

 that which assureth copie of invention, and contracteth 

 judgment to a strength. But this is true, that of the 

 methods of common-places that I have seen, there is none 

 of any sufficient worth ; all of them carrying merely the face 

 of a school, and not of a world; and referring to vulgar 

 matters and pedantical divisions, without all Hfe or respect 

 to action. 

 2. For the other principal part of the custody of knowledge, 

 which is Memory, I find that faculty in my judgment weakly 

 inquired of. An art * there is extant of it ; but it seemeth 



* Aristot. Analyt. Pr. ii. 5, i. 



" Cf. Aristot. De Mem. See the article in the Encycl. Britannicat 

 " On Mnemonics." Cf. Cicero, De Rhet. iii. and De Or at. ii- 



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