The Second Book 2 1 1 



this deserveth to be highly magnified ; holding and preserv- 

 ing the golden mediocrity in this point between the law of 

 the heathen and the law of Mahomet, which have embraced 

 the two extremes. For the religion of the heathen had no 

 constant beHef or confession, but left all to the hberty of 

 argument; and the religion of Mahomet, on the other side, 

 interdicteth argument altogether: the one having the very 

 face of error, and the other of imposture : whereas the faith 

 doth both admit and reject disputation with difference. 

 5. The use of human reason in religion is of two sorts: the 

 former, in the conception and apprehension of the mysteries 

 of God to us revealed; the other, in the inferring and 

 deriving of doctrine and direction thereupon. The former 

 extendeth to the mysteries themselves; but how? by way 

 of illustration, and not by way of argument: the latter 

 consisteth indeed of probation and argument. In the 

 former, we see, God vouchsafeth to descend to our capacity, 

 in the expressing of his mysteries in sort as may be sensible 

 unto us; and doth graft his revelations and holy doctrine 

 upon the notions of our reason, and appUeth his inspirations 

 to open our understanding, as the form of the key to the 

 ward of the lock: for the latter, there is allowed us a use of 

 reason and argument, secondary and respective, although 

 not original and absolute. For after the articles and 

 principles of religion are placed and exempted from exam- 

 ination of reason, it is then permitted unto us to make 

 derivations and inferences from and according to the 

 analogy of them, for our better direction. In nature this 

 holdeth not; for both the principles are examinable by 

 induction, though not by a medium or syllogism; and 

 besides, those principles or first positions have no discord- 

 ance with that reason which draweth down and deduceth 

 the inferior positions. But yet it holdeth not in religion 

 alone, but in many knowledges, both of greater and smaller 

 nature, namely, wherein there are not only posita but 

 placita : for in such there can be no use of absolute reason. 

 We see it famiharly in games of wit, as chess, or the like: 

 the draughts and first laws of the game are positive, but 

 how ? merely ad, placitum, and not examinable by reason ; 

 but then how to direct our play thereupon with best 

 advantage to win the game, is artificial and rational. So 

 in human laws, there be many grounds and maxims which 



