1S37.] 



FARMERS' REGIS 'lER. 



757 



of much greater importance is to be deduced from 

 these curious facts, m the most explicit confirma- 

 tion ot" the precedinfT principles, that all great va- 

 riations in the price of corn are enirendored by ap- 

 prehension, and do not depend on the quanlity in 

 the markets. The report of Aions. Necker's mea- 

 sures, we have liiund, did not sink, but raised the 

 price: providinij France witli less '.ban three days' 

 bread, when blazed l()rth with all the apparatus of 

 jjoverimient, actually ro/serf the price in the mar- 

 kets, where I was a witness, 25 per cent. Of what 

 possible consequence was three days' provision 

 added to the national stock, when compared with 

 the misery and iiimine implied — and which actu- 

 alh^ took phice in consequence of pushinfj the price 

 up so enormously, by Mons. Necker's measures? 

 Would it not have been infinitely wiser never to 

 have stopped the trade, which \ have proved to 

 have been a trade of import? — Never to have ex- 

 pressed any solicitude? — Never to have taken any 

 public steps, but to have let the demand and sup- 

 ply quietly meet, without noise and without pa- 

 rade? The consequence would have been, sav- 

 ing 45 millions of public money, and the lives of 

 some hundred thousands, starved by the high price 

 that was created, even without a scarcity ; for I am 

 firmly persuaded, that if no public step whatever 

 had been taken, and the archbishop of Sens' edict 

 never repealed, the price of wheat in no part of 

 France would have seen, in 17S9, so hiixh a rate 

 as 30 liv. instead of rising to 50 and 57 liv. If 

 there is any truth in these principles, what are we 

 to think of the first niinisfer hunting after a little 

 popularity, and boasting, in his Memoire, that the 

 king allowed only bread of wheat and rye mixed 

 to be served at his own table? What were the 

 conclusions to be looked for in the people, but that, 

 if such were the extremities to which France was 

 reduced, all were in danger of death for want ol" 

 bread. The consequence is palpable ; — a blind 

 rage against monopolizers, hanging bakers, seiz- 

 ing barges, and sptting fire to magazines; and 

 the inevitable effect of a sudden and enormous 

 rise in the price, wherever such measures are pre- 

 cipitated by the populace, who never are truly ac- 

 tive but in their own destruction. It was the same 

 spirit that dictated the following passage, in the 

 Memoirs instruct ife — "Zes accaparements sont la 

 premiere cause a la quelle la multitude attribue la 

 cherie des grains, et en effet on a souvent eu lieu 

 de se plaindre de la cupidite des speculateurs.''^ I 

 cannot read these lines, which are as untrue in 

 fact as erroneous in argument, without indigna- 

 tion. The multitude never have to complain of 

 speculators; they are always greatly indebted to 

 them. There is no such thing as monopolizing 

 corn but to the benefit of the people* And all the 



* I am much inclined to believe, that no sort of mo- 

 nopoly ever was, or ever can be injurious, without the 

 assistance of government; and that government never 

 tends in the least to favor a monopoly without doing 

 infinite mischief. We have heard in England of at- 

 tempts to monopolize hemp, alum, cotton, and many 

 other articles; ill-conceived speculations, that always 

 ended in the ruin of schemers, and eventually did o'ood, 

 as I could show, if this were the proper place. But to 

 monopolize any article of common and daily supply and 

 consumption, to a mischievous degree, is absolutely im- 

 possible : to bu}' large quantities, at the chfapest sea- 

 son of the year, in order to hoard and bring them out at 

 the very dearest moment, is the idea of a monopolizer or 



evils of the year 1789 would have been prevent- 

 ed, if monopolizers, by raising the price in the 

 preceding autunm, and by lessening the consump- 

 tion, had divided the supply more equally through 

 the year. In a country like France, sub-<livided 

 mischievously into little lijrms, the quantity of 

 corn in the markets in autumn is always beyond 

 the proportion reserved for PU[)plying the rest of 

 the year: of this evil, the best remedy is. enlarg- 

 ing the size of liirrns; but when this does not take 

 place, the dealings of monopolizers are the only re- 

 source. They buy when corn is cheap, in order 

 to hoard it UH it is dear ; this is their speculation, 

 and it is precisely the conduct that keeps the peo- 

 ple from starving; all imaginable encouragement 

 should be given to such merchants, whose busi- 

 ness answers every purpose of public granaries, 



accapareur ; this is, of all other transactions, the most 

 beneficial towards an equal supply. The wheat which 

 such a man buys is cheap, or he would not buy it with 

 a view to profit. What does he then ? He takes from 

 the market a portion, when the supply is large; and he 

 brings that portion to the market when the supply is 

 small; and for doing this you hang him as an enemy. 

 Why? Because he has made a private profit, perhaps 

 a very great one, by coming in between the fanner and 

 the consumer. What should induce him to carry on his 

 business, except the desire of profit ? But the benefit of 

 the people is exactly in proportion to the greatness of 

 that profit, since it arises directly from the low price of 

 corn at one season, and the dearness of it at another. 

 Most clearly any trade which tends to level this ine- 

 quality is advantageous in proportion as it elf'ccts it. 

 By buying great quantities when cheap, the price is 

 raised, and the consumplion forced to be more sparing : 

 this circumstance can alone save the people from fam- 

 ine ; if, when the crop is scanty, the people consume 

 plentifully in autumn, they must inevitably starve in 

 summer; and they certainly will consume plentifully 

 if corn is cheap. Government cannot step in and say, 

 you shall now eat half a pound of bread only, that you 

 may not by-and-by be put to half an ounce. Govern- 

 ment cannot do tliis without erecting [public] grana- 

 ries, which we know, by the experience of all Europe, 

 is a most pernicious system, and done at an expense 

 which, if laid out in premiums encouraging cultiva- 

 tion, would convert deserts into fruitful corn-fields. 

 But private monopolizers can and do effect it; for by 

 their purchases in cheap months they raise the price, 

 and exactly in that proportion lessen the consumption ; 

 this is the great object, for nothing else can make a 

 short crop hold out through the year; when once this 

 is effected, the people are safe ; they may pay very dear 

 afterwards, but the corn will be forth-coming, and they 

 will have it, though at a high price. But reverse the 

 medal, and suppose no monopolizers ; in such a case, 

 the cheapness in autumn continuing, the free consump- 

 tion would continue with it; and an undue portion be- 

 ing eaten in winter, the summer would come without 

 its supply: this was manifestly the history of 17S9; the 

 people enraged at the idea of monopolizers, not at their 

 real existence (for the nation was starving for want of 

 them,) hung the miserable dealers, on the idea of their 

 having done what they were utterly unable to do. Thus, 

 with such a system of small farms as empty the whole 

 crop into the markets in autumn, and make no reserve 

 for summer, there is no possible remedy, but many and 

 great monopolizers, who are beneficial to the public 

 exactly in proportion to their profits. But in a country 

 like England, divided into large farms, such corn deal- 

 ers are not equally wanted ; the farmers are rich enough 

 to wait for their returns, and keep a due reserve in stacks 

 to be thrashed in summer; the best of all methods of 

 keeping corn, and the only one m which it receives no 

 damage. 



