SCIENTIFIC METHOD AND THE BIBLE. 291 



find an instance of inquiry into the cause of more definite and limited 

 phenomena, which seems much more to suggest the true spirit of 

 physical inquiry. We have one recorded by Herodotus, which is 

 the more remarkable from being so nearly alone. It is in refer- 

 ence to the fact which he had observed about the flooding of the 

 Nile that it was flooded for one hundred days, beginning with the 

 summer solstice; and that from that time it diminished, and was 

 during the winter months very low. He tells us that he made 

 pressing inquiries about the cause of it from many of the Egyptians, 

 but that he found no satisfaction, and apparently little interest in 

 the matter. Three different theories on the subject that had been 

 propounded by the Greeks he examines in detail and confutes; and 

 finally he states a theory of his own. And yet even in this instance 

 of scientific inquiry he commits the usual fault of the Greeks he does 

 not pursue far enough the investigation of the facts of the case, and 

 the absence of the facts he tries to make up for by exhaustive argu- 

 ments on words used in describing the phenomena. 



Strange as it may seem at a first glance, it is a very similar 

 trouble that we find with the reasoning of Aristotle. It seems 

 strange, I say, because we are accustomed to associate with Aristotle 

 just those things which would seem to indicate a scientific temper, 

 and to give promise of great results: 1. Extensive accumulation of 

 facts. Many of those works of Aristotle which remain to us are 

 vast treasuries of facts collected from almost every field of Nature, 

 and we have reason for thinking that he made other wonderful collec- 

 tions of facts which have not come down to us. His work has been a 

 standing marvel to all time. 2. Extraordinary powers of reasoning. 

 3. The fact that he asserted in the strongest terms the need of build- 

 ing up the whole superstructure of knowledge on experience. And 

 yet throughout his works, side by side with the evidences of pro- 

 found knowledge and profound speculation, there are repeated in- 

 stances of reasonings which are not only unsound, but altogether 

 puerile e. gV, in the beginning of his treatise on the heavens he 

 proves the world to be perfect by reasoning of the following kind: 

 " The bodies of which the world is composed are solids, and therefore 

 have three dimensions. Now, three is the most perfect number; it 

 is the first of numbers, for of one we do not speak as a number; 

 of two we say both; but three is the first number of which we say 

 all; moreover, it has a beginning, a middle, and an end." That 

 is a fair instance of his scientific incompetency. He has the facts, 

 he is able to reason, but he does not reason according to the facts; 

 he loses sight of them and builds up great arguments on words and 

 names. To give one more example : " He is endeavoring to explain 

 the fact that when the sun's light passes through a hole, whatever 



