1894 AWARD OF THE FISHERY COMMISSION. 



two governments as to the extent of the rights which belong to the citi- 

 zens of the United States and Her Majesty's subjects, respectively, with 

 reference to the fisheries on the coasts of Her Majesty's possessions in 

 North America, and as to any other questions," &c. 



Had the " status " contended for in the United States brief been con- 

 templated, it is reasonable to suppose that it would have been formally 

 adopted or referred to in the treaty. Not only, however, are the proto- 

 cols of the conference silent on this subject, but no record exists that 

 such a status was ever entertained as a basis of negotiation on the part 

 of either government. On the contrary, and as if to exclude the possi- 

 bility of doubt, the words of the Convention of 1818 are adopted in their 

 integrity, and thus constituted the legal and actual basis on which the 

 indemnity to be paid is to be assessed. 



The question, therefore, is simply one of construction of words. The 

 particular expressions in the first article of the Convention, which have 

 furnished the occasion of a disputed construction, are " on or within 

 three marine miles of any of the coasts, bays, creeks, or harbors of His 

 Britannic Majesty's dominions." For the solution of this question it 

 will be convenient, in the first place, to state certain principles of inter- 

 pretation to which recourse may be had when there is any ambiguity 

 in the terms of the treaty. 



In the first place, it is an universal rule, dictated by common sense, 

 for the interpretation of contracts, and equally applicable to all instru- 

 ments, that if there is anything ambiguous in the terms in which they 

 are expressed they shall be explained by the common use of those terms 

 in the country in which the contracts were made. (Pothier, Obligations, 

 No. 94, Ce qui pent paraitre amblgu dans un contrat, sHnterprete par ce 

 qiii est damage dans le pays.) 



In the second place, it is an admitted principle that, for the meaning of 

 the technical language of jurisprudence, we are to look to the laws and 

 jurisprudence of the country, if the words have acquired a plain and 

 positive meaning. (The Huntress, Davie's Admiralty [American] Reports 

 p. 100. Flint v. Flemyng, 1 Barnwall and Adolphus, 48.) 



In the third place, as treaties are contracts belonging to the law of 

 nations, and the law of nations is the common property of all nations, 

 and, as such, a part and parcel of the law of every country (De Lovio 

 . Boit, 2 Gallison's Admiralty [American] Reports, p. 398; Buvot v. 

 Burbot, cited by Lord Mansfield in Triquet and others v. Peach, 3 Bur- 

 rows, p. 1481), if we .have recourse to the usage of nations, or to the 

 decisions of courts in which the law of nations is administered, for the 

 definition of terms which occur in such contracts, and which have 

 received a plain and positive meaning, we are not going beyond the law 

 of either of the countries which are parties to the treaty. 



Vattel says that it is not allowable to interpret what has no need of 

 interpretation. If the meaning be evident, and the conclusion not 

 obscure, you have no right to look beyond or beneath it, to alter or add 

 to it by conjecture. Wolff adds, that to do so is to remove all certainty 

 from human transactions. To affix a particular sense, founded on ety- 

 mology or other reasons, upon an expression, in order to evade the obli- 

 gation arising from the customary meaning, is a fraudulent subterfuge 

 aggravating the guilt of one fcedifragous party "frausenim adstrinffit 

 non dwgolvit perjurium? 



These rules are adopted by T. D. Woolsey, late president of Yale Col- 

 lege (New York, 1877), p. 185, 109, in his Introduction to the study of 

 International Law. 



The Convention of 1818 was a contract between Great Britain and 



