AWARD OF THE FISHERY COMMISSION. 195 



the United States, and is to be construed like any other contract. The 

 rule for such construction is well laid dowu by Mr. Addison in hi* work 

 on contracts (seventh edition) at page 164. lie says: " Every contract 

 ought to be so construed that no clause, sentence, or wort! shall be 

 superfluous, void, or insignificant; every word ought to operate in some 

 shape or other, nam verba debent intelligi cum effect* ut ret magi* raleat 

 quam pereat." 



In Robertson v. French (4 Bast, 137), Lord Ellenborough says that the 

 terms of a contract " are to be understood in their plain, ordinary, and 

 popular sense, unless they have generally, in respect to the subject-mat- 

 ter (as by the known usage of trade or the like), acquired a peculiar 

 sense distinct from the popular sense of the same words." 



In the case of Shore v. Wilson (9 Clark and Finnelly. pp. 565, 50i>), 

 Lord Chief Justice Tindal, speaking of the construction of written inatru- 

 ments, says: "When the words of any written instrument are free from 

 ambiguity in themselves, and where external circumstances do not create 

 any doubt or difficulty as to the proper application to claimants under 

 the instrument, or to the subject-matter to which the instrument relates, 

 such instrument is always to be construed according to the strict, plain, 

 and common meaning of the words themselves, and evidence dchort the 

 instrument for the purpose of explaining it according to the surmised 

 or alleged intention of the parties is utterly inadmissible." 



In fact, judges, arbitrators, or commissioners, who would disregard 

 such rules, would assume the right ot recasting the law or the treaties 

 to suit their own fancy, instead of enforcing the execution of a clear con- 

 tract. In this instance the two parties agree not to invite this Commis- 

 sion to travel over such ground, and her Majesty's Government are con- 

 fident that the Commissioners will adhere to the instructions contained 

 in the Washington Treaty, which directs them to estimate the value of 

 the privileges added by article 18 to those already enjoyed under arti- 

 cle 1 of the Convention of 1818. 



As regards the power of arbitrators, such as the Commissioners in 

 this instance, to interpret terms of treaties, Ilertslet's Treaties, vol. 3, p. 

 518, contain the following precedent: 



Great Britain and the United States having referred a diffieultv, grow- 

 ing out of the Treaty of Ghent (1814), to the arbitration of the Emperor 

 of Kussia, to interpret the intentiom of the parties as contained in an 

 article of that treaty, his Imperial Majesty stated that he considered 

 himself bound " strictly to adhere to the grammatical interpretation of 

 article first," &c. And, on a further reference to his Majesty (same 

 vol., p. 521), the Emperor was of opinion that the question could only 

 be decided according to the literal and grammatical meaning of *rtloM 1 

 of the Treaty of Ghent. A notice of this decision is to be found in 

 Lawrence's 2d edition of Wheaton, pp. 495, 496. 



The Emperor of Kussia, in dealing with this question, acted 

 ance with the rules laid dowu in Phillimore's International Law, v J. 

 p. 72, as follows: " LXIX. Usual interpretation is, in the case of 

 that meaning which the practice of nations has affixed to the use o 

 tain expressions and phrases, or to the conclusions deducib e f 

 omissions, whether they are or are not to be understood by ueces* 

 implications. A clear usage is the best of all interpreters betwt* 

 tious, as between individuals ; and it is not legally competen 

 nation or party to recede from its verdict." And at p. * 

 author says : The principal rule has already been adverted to, nj 

 to follow the ordinary and usual acceptations, the plain anc 

 meaning of the language employed. This rule is, in fact, mcu 



