AWARD OF THE FISHERY COMMISSION. 1897 



It would thus appear that it is not necessary to understand the wortl 

 " shore" before "coasts" in order that the latter word should be fully 

 intelligible. It remains to consider whether such an undemanding 

 would be authorized by usage on the principle laid down by PothU-r : 

 " L'usage est d'une si graude autorite" pour Interpretation des conven- 

 tions, qu'on sousenteud dans un contrat les clauses qui sont d'usage, 

 quoiqu'elles ne soient pas expriinees." (Obligations, No. 93.) 



No such usage, however, of nations prevails, applicable to the term 

 " coasts." Islands, indeed, which are adjacent to the land, have been 

 pronounced by Lord Stowell to be natural appendages of the coast on 

 which they border, and to be comprised within the bounds of territory. 

 (The Anna, 5 Kobinson's Reports, p. 385.) The assertion, therefore, of 

 an usage to understand the word " shore " before " coasts " in treaties, 

 would tend to limit the bounds of territorial jurisdiction allowed by 

 Lord Stowell in the case just cited, in which a question was involved to 

 which the United States Government was a party, and in favor of 

 whose claim, on the ground of violated territory, Lord Stowell pro- 

 nounced. 



It remains next to consider what is the true construction of the ex- 

 pressions within three marine miles of any of the u bays, creeks, or 

 harbors." That the words " bays," " creeks," and " harbors " have all 

 and each a distinct sense, separate from and supplemental to the word 

 "coasts," to which effect must be given, where there are reciprocal 

 rights and obligations growing out of the treaty in which these words 

 have been introduced, is consonant with the rules for interpreting con- 

 tracts, which have been dictated by right reason, and are sanctioned by 

 judicial decisions. Mr. Justice Story may be cited as an authority of 

 the highest eminence, who has recognized and applied this principle in 

 construing a statute of the United States. " The other words," he says, 

 /'descriptive of place in the present statute (Statute 18L'~>, c. L'70, s. 22) t 

 which declare that * if any person or persons on the high seas, or iu 

 any arm of the sea, or in any river, haven, creek, basin, or bay, within 

 the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States, and out of the jurisdic- 

 tion of any particular State,' &c., give great additional weight to the 

 suggestion that the ' high seas' meant the open, uninclosed ocean, or 

 that portion of the sea which is without the faucet terra: on the sea- 

 coast, in contradistinction to that which is surrounded or inclosed be- 

 tween narrow headlands or promontories ; for if the ' high neat ' meant to 

 include other icaters, why should the supplemental words, 'arm of the w t 

 river, creek, bay,' &c., have been used ?" (United States r. Grush, 6 Ala- 

 son's Admiralty Reports, p. 298.) 



This view of Mr. Justice Story is in accordance with Pothiers ile, 

 " Lorsqu'nne clause est susceptible de deux sens, on doit jriutot 1'euten 

 dredans celni dans lequel elle peut avoir quelqne effet que danscelui 

 dans lequel elle n'en pourrait avoir aucun." (Obligations, No. 



The word "bay" itself has also received & plain and positire mean 

 in a judicial decision of a most important case before the SupremeOwii 

 of the United States, upon the construction of the 8th section of 

 act of 1790, cap. 9 : A murder had been committed on board the I 

 States ship of war Independence, lying in Massachusetts Bay, am 

 question was whether any court of the State of Massachusetts 01 

 the circuit court of the United States, as a court of admiralty a 

 itime jurisdiction, had jurisdiction over a murder committed 

 .bay. Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering the opinion of 

 defined " bays" to be " inclosed part* of the sea." (United State 

 3 Wheaton's Reports, p. 387.) 



