1898 AWARD OF THE FISHERY COMMISSION. 



Again, Mr. Justice Story, in a question of indictment for assault with 

 intent to kill, under the crimes statute of 1825, cap. 276, sec. 22, which 

 declares " that if any person or persons upon the high seas, or in any 

 arm of the sea, or in any river, haven, creek, basin, or bay, within the 

 admiralty jurisdiction of the United States, and out of the jurisdiction 

 of any particular State, on board any vessel, shall commit an assault," 

 :c., decided that the place where the murder was committed (the ves- 

 sel lying at such time between certain islands in the mouth of the Bos- 

 ton River) was an arm of the sea. 



"An arm of the sea," he further said, " may include various descrip- 

 tion of waters, where the tide ebbs and flows. It may be a river, har- 

 bor, creek, basin, or bay." (United States v. Grush, 5 Mason, 299.) 



It would thus appear that the word " bay " has received a positive 

 definition as a term of jurisprudence, which is in accordance with the 

 common use of the term in text-books on the law of nations, which 

 invariably speak of " bays" as "portions of sea inclosed within indents of 

 coasts? and not as indents of coast. 



Assuming, therefore, as established beyond reasonable doubt, that the 

 word " bay " signifies an arm or elbow of the sea inclosed within head- 

 lands or peaks, and not an indent of the coast, we may consider what is 

 the true intention of the expression " within three marine miles of a bay." 

 Are such miles to be measured from the outer edge or chord of the bay, 

 or from the inner edge or arc of the bay ? In the first place it may be 

 observed, that the inner edge or arc of a bay touches the coast, and if 

 the distance is to be measured from the shore of the bay, the word " bay" 

 itself has virtually no distinct signification from " coast," and has no 

 supplemental force; prima facie, therefore, this interpretation does not 

 recommend itself on the grounds already stated. 



Again, the interpretation which is given to the measure of distance 

 from bays must be given to the measure ot distance from creeks and 

 harbors, both of which, by the municipal law of the United States, 

 equally as of Great Britain, are infra corpus comitatus, and whose waters 

 are subject to the provisions of the municipal law precisely as the shores 

 of the land itself. But it may assist in determining this question to 

 keep in mind the rule that in contracts " on doit interpreter une clause 

 par les autres clauses contenues dans 1'acte, soit qu'elles precedent ou 

 suivent." (Pothier, ^Obligations, No. 96.) In other words, a subsequent 

 clause may serve to interpret a former clause, if the latter be at all am- 

 biguous. Accordingly, we find the renunciation of the liberty to fish 

 within three marine miles of any of the bays, creeks, or harbors of His 

 Britannic Majesty's dominions followed by the proviso that American 

 fishermen shall be permitted to enter such bays and harbors for certain 

 specified purposes other than taking fish. In other words, they may 

 prosecute their voyage for other purposes than fishing within the entrance 

 of any bay or harbor, but may not take fish within three marine miles 

 of any bay or harbor, i. e., within three marine miles of the entrance of 

 any bay or harbor. If this interpretation be not adopted, the proviso 

 would be absurd ; for if American fishermen are implicitly permitted to 

 Ish within three marine miles of the shore of any bay or harbor, they 

 are permitted to enter such bay or harbor, if the breadth of the mouth 

 be more than six miles, and the distance of the head of the bay or harbor 

 from the entrance be more than three miles, for another purpose than 

 for the purpose of shelter, or of repairing damages, or of purchasing 

 wood, or of obtaining water. 



But the convention expressly says, "for no other purpose whatever.'" 

 If, therefore, they cannot enter any bay or harbor for the purpose of 



