AWARD OF THE FISHERY COMMISSION. 1899 



prosecuting their occupation of fishing, it cannot be intended that they 

 should be allowed to fish within three marine miles of the shore of any 

 bay or harbor, as the two provisions would be inconsistent. Accord- 

 ingly, as the question resolves itself into the alternative interpretation 

 of shore or entrance, it follows that the correct interpretation which 

 makes the language of the entire article consistent with itself is within 

 three marine miles of the entrance of any bay, such entrance or mouth 

 being, in fact, part of the bay iteelf, and the bay being approachable by 

 fishing vessels only in the direction of the mouth or entrance. 



That a bay of sea-water wider than six miles at its month may be 

 within the body of a county is laid down by Lord Hale in his treatise 

 De Jure Maris et Brachiorum ejusdem (Hargrove's Tract*, chapter 4): 

 "An arm or branch of the sea which lies within the fauces terror, where 

 a man may reasonably discern between shore and shore, is, or at limit 

 may be, within the body of a county." This doctrine lias been expressly 

 adopted by Mr. Justice Story in De Lovio v. Boit (2 Gallison's Reports, 

 p. 426, 2d ed.), in which, to use the language of Mr. Whealou's argu- 

 ment in United States v. Bevans (3 Wheatou's Reports, p. 358), " alt the 

 learning on the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the admiralty is col- 

 lected together." There is, consequently, no doubt that the jurisdiction 

 of the municipal law over bays is not limited to bays which are leas 

 than six miles in breadth or three miles in depth, since the general rule 

 is, as was observed by the same eminent judge in United States v. Grush 

 (5 Mason, p. 300) : " That such parts of rivers, arms, and creeks of sea, 

 are deemed to be within the bodies of counties, where persons can see 

 from one side to the other." 



That the jurisprudence of the United States has recognized the prin- 

 ciple of courts of municipal law exercising jurisdiction over bays at a 

 distance more than three miles from the shore, is shown by the decision 

 ,of the Supreme Court in the case of Church v. Hubbard. 2 Crunch'* 

 Reports, p. 187.) In this case an American brigantine, the Aurora, when 

 at anchor in the Bay of Para on the coast of Brazil, and four or five 

 leagues from Cape Paxos, was seized aud condemned by the Portuguese 

 authorities for a breach of the laws of Portugal on a matter of illicit 

 trade. Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering the opinion of the court, 

 said, "Nothing is to be drawn from the laws or usages of nations which 

 proves that the seizure of the Aurora by the Portuguese Government 

 was an act of lawless violence." 



The same principle was also involved in the opinion of the Attorney 

 General of the United States upon the seizure of the British veiwel 

 Grange by a French frigate within the Bay of Delaware, and 

 was accordingly returned to the owners. In his re|ort to the I 

 States Government (14 May, 1793), the Attorney General obter 

 " that the Grange was arrested in the Delaware, within the cape*, U 

 she had reached the sea," that is, in that part of the waters of the 

 ware which is called the Bay of Delaware, and which extends 

 of sixty miles within the capes. It is worthy of remark that 

 Delaware is not within the body of a county, its northern 

 Cape May, belonging to the State of New Jersey in proj>erty a 

 diction, and its southern headland, Cape Heulopen, being part 

 State of Delaware, yet the whole bay was held to be Amencaj 



The same principle was also involved in the judgment ot t 

 Court of the United States in the case of Martin and other. 

 (16 Peters' Reports, 367), in which it was agreed on all 

 prerogative of the Crown prior to the American Revolution 



