408 LIFE OF DALTON : 



physical law can hardly be said to occur in the ancient phi- 

 losophy though some few passages may vaguely express the 

 idea. But another question, yet current in our own time, 

 and which lies at the bottom of every atomic theory, engaged 

 more distinctly the notice of these schools of antiquity a 

 question which neither reason nor experiment can ever do 

 more than settle presumptively viz. whether there are 

 truly ultimate molecules or atoms of matter insusceptible of 

 further division ? or whether we must here, as elsewhere in 

 nature, veil our reason before that metaphysical infinite 

 which baffles alike definition and conception, and consider 

 matter as divisible without limit or end ? 



The most rational of the Greek philosophers settled this 

 abstruse question in the same way in which it has been 

 conditionally determined by the sounder methods of modern 

 science. The phrases employed (aSiaipsra psysOrj aSialpsra 

 awfjuaTa afisprj ra l\a^ora, &c.) interpret to us their belief 

 that there are portions of matter, inconceivably minute, 

 which are absolute units in- themselves, and admit of no 

 division beyond. This doctrine is wholly distinct from the 

 ancient theory of the four elements (the 'four champions 

 fierce' of Milton), which served as a coarse formula for 

 reason to work upon, before it had been shown by experi- 

 ment how completely these elements are mutually conver- 

 tible throughout every part of the material world. 



Another point in the ancient atomic philosophy, anticipat- 

 ing modern enquiry though running beyond it, is the question 

 as to the form or configuration of those indivisible atoms, 

 which may be regarded as the true units of the material 

 world. Here, again, all was mere speculation; and the 

 geometrical forms assigned to different conditions of matter 

 were generally based on the feeblest and most frivolous ana- 

 logies. Whether modern science, with its more severe and 

 scrupulous enquiry, can ever attain to more perfect proof 



