VISION. 87 



that the idea of vision must have previously existed 

 before it could form part of the consciousness of 

 any animal ; and in the evolutions of organs of 

 sight I am compelled to recognize in the simpler 

 forms the early stages of a morphological design, 

 moving forward in definite directions to accomplish 

 a mode of contact between the external world and 

 the consciousness of animals, the idea of which 

 already existed. 



Is it in accordance with anything that we know 

 of the laws of nature that such contact should be of 

 an arbitrary and purely artificial kind ? Consider 

 that while we are without experience of spirit-life, 

 except in connection with body, it would be credu- 

 lity to suppose that no spirits exist save those 

 enchained by matter. Suppose them to exist, and 

 suppose them to appreciate the material universe 

 in that intrinsic character which reason and not 

 sense informs us of, namely, as so many centres of 

 force inhabiting space, it is plain that they cannot 

 have vision in the sense in which we have it a 

 sensation artificially produced through affected 

 nerves. They cannot have any of our senses. But 

 must they necessarily be devoid of the ideas which 

 they represent ? Is it necessary to suppose that 

 things which we possess in common with the 

 majority of animals exist nowhere else in the whole 



